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ABSTRACT—This Essay links criminal theory to democratic political
theory, arguing that the view of criminal law and procedure known as
“reconstructivism” shares a common root with certain culturally oriented
forms of democratic theory. The common root is the valorization of a
community’s ethical life and the belief that law and government should
reflect the ethical life of the community living under that law and
government. This Essay then specifies three principles that are entailed by
the union of democracy and reconstructivism and that should therefore
characterize a democracy’s approach to criminal justice: the “moral culture
principle of criminalization,” the “principle of prosocial punishment,” and
the “We the People principle of criminal procedure.” As the American
criminal system routinely violates all three principles, this Essay closes by
suggesting that the present crisis of American criminal justice stems in
substantial part from criminal law and procedure’s bureaucratic and
instrumental, rather than democratic and reconstructive, path of
development. The three principles point to a better alternative and suggest a
direction for criminal justice reform.
AUTHOR—Associate Professor of Law and (by courtesy) Philosophy,
Northwestern University.
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INTRODUCTION
The object of this Essay is to link a theory of criminal law and
procedure I’ve developed in prior work, “reconstructivism,”1 to the theory
and practice of democracy. On the theoretical side, the claim is this: a
decent community’s ethical life—by which I mean the moral culture
disclosed by a community’s public deliberations or implicit in its social
practices and institutions, provided those deliberations, practices, and
institutions reflect or were formed in reasonably non-oppressive
conditions—should command a measure of political authority in
democratic societies because part of what collective self-determination
means is that a political community can see its norms reflected in its laws.
Ethical life should likewise command authority on a reconstructive
approach to criminal law and procedure because reconstructivism holds
that criminal justice’s distinctive social function is to protect and repair the
social norms on which community solidarity depends in the wake of acts
that attack those norms. Reconstructivism as a theory of criminal justice
and democracy as a theory of government are thus linked by what they
mutually treasure—by the fact that both valorize a decent community’s
ability to build a distinctive form of life infused with values that are the
community’s own.
On the practical side, this Essay specifies three principles that follow
from the democracy/reconstructivism union and should therefore
characterize a democratic society’s approach to criminal justice. Briefly
stated, the “moral culture principle of criminalization” holds that, barring
special conditions, only those acts that violate and attack the values on
which social life is based, and can therefore truly be characterized as
“antisocial,” should be legally designated crimes. The “principle of
1

Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1485 (2016).
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prosocial punishment” holds that punishment’s first purpose and
justification is to provide a prosocial response to an antisocial act,
restitching the social fabric that crime tears (assuming “crime” is defined
according to the moral culture principle). Finally, the “We the People
principle of criminal procedure” holds that the administration and
enforcement of criminal law should be so structured that lay citizens take
part in it and see their sense of justice at work in it, rather than left wholly
to officials and experts acting on the instrumental reasons characteristic of
bureaucratic control.
What is most striking about these three principles in light of American
criminal justice today is how routinely they are violated: we criminalize for
instrumental reasons unconnected to or inconsistent with our culture, we
punish in ways that are nearly as antisocial as crime itself, and we
administer and enforce criminal law through procedures that crowd lay
voices out of the system and undermine social solidarity rather than
building it. We have, in short, drifted away from what might be termed
democratic–reconstructive forms of order in criminal justice and toward
bureaucratic–instrumental ones, and this Essay’s final suggestion is that
much of our present dysfunction traces back to this drift. So the three
principles have something to teach us about the way out of the crisis. They
do not by any means address all of the complex questions of law, practice,
and policy the crisis presents, but I submit that these three principles
illuminate the appropriate direction of change. They show us where the gap
is between criminal law as it is and criminal law as it should be.
As this is an exceedingly short essay for goals so ambitious, a caveat
is in order. The arguments here are designed to show how a set of ideas
developed in prior work and planned future work hang together, not to
explain and defend those ideas in full. Each of the pieces—
reconstructivism, democracy, the three principles, the diagnosis of the
present, the prescription for the future—is complicated and subject to
reasonable objections that merit careful responses, which this Essay is not
meant to provide. The only thing I hope to explain here is how the pieces
fit into a whole.
I.

RECONSTRUCTIVISM

Reconstructivism holds that criminal law and procedure have a
distinctive role to play in the social world: where a wrong has been
committed that is of such a nature as to attack the values on which social
life is based, it is the office of criminal law to reconstruct that violated
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normative order (hence “normative reconstruction” or “reconstructivism”).2
To use the clichéd but helpful metaphor, where crime tears the social
fabric, criminal law’s distinctive function is to restitch it. If criminal law
does not do so and no adequate substitute for criminal law is found, the
authority of the violated norm and the dignity of any violated victims will
be diminished. The unanswered wrong will exact a cost in the currency of
social solidarity: members of the society will over time come to feel less
bound to one another, to the norm violated by the crime, and by extension
to the normative order of the state and the law as a whole. Gradually, the
society’s substructure of shared values will be altered or broken, and a
society thus damaged will be less able to secure the flourishing of the
community and the individuals who make it up than one with an intact,
shared set of values.
Reconstructivism is thus a type of communitarian consequentialism,3
but it is a minimal type of communitarianism because it is localized to
criminal law, because the norms at work in criminal law tend to be (or
should be) fairly basic and widely acknowledged, and because wrongs that
attack the foundations of social life are uncommon and therefore leave
plenty of room for norm contestation. So a reconstructivist need not be a
communitarian about all things: one could, for example, be a
reconstructivist about criminal law and favor the individualistic, creative
destruction of free markets, because a reconstructivist could without
inconsistency hold that the market should not have a communitarian
character. Not every component of a complex society has the same internal
norms or organizing ends. Nor need a reconstructivist disagree with
political liberalism’s claim that societies are and should be comprised of
diverse individuals and subcommunities with different sets of values,
whose goal in the political sphere is to find fair terms of cooperation rather
than complete normative agreement.4 Emphatically, a reconstructivist can
acknowledge and even celebrate norm contestation, particularly if one
follows the thread of reconstructivism to deliberative democracy, as I

2

1.

This discussion surveys the ground more fully covered in Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note

3

In a previous article, I stated: “[W]hile I don’t have strong objections to characterizing
reconstructivism as consequentialist, I think the characterization obscures more than it illuminates.”
Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1532. I now think that was an error: the “consequentialist”
label is helpful.
4
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii, xxv (1993) (“[T]he problem of political
liberalism is: How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal
citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines? . . . What are the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens characterized as free and
equal yet divided by profound doctrinal conflict?”).
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suggest below.5 Reconstructivism’s premise is only this: every society—
including diverse, democratic ones (perhaps especially diverse, democratic
ones)—needs some minimum of normative alignment around a shared set
of values if it is to safeguard and advance the flourishing of the community
and the individuals who make it up, because a society without that
minimum will be unable to secure the benefits of social cooperation,
mitigate the risks of social conflict, sustain itself over time, and maintain a
functioning public sphere (including a sphere of values contestation).6 That
premise granted, reconstructivism only points out criminal law and
procedure’s distinctive place in maintaining this minimum of normative
alignment.
Why “distinctive”? Many social practices and institutions contribute
to maintaining normative alignment, most obviously educational ones;
what makes criminal justice so important? The answer has to do with the
special character of crime—that is, with the special problem presented by
serious wrongdoing. The problem of wrongdoing is different from the
problem of evil, which, in secular terms, is the problem of how we can
rationally maintain belief in or hope for the goodness of the world in light

5

See infra Part II. In fact, the idea that communitarians of any sort must insist on an unchanging
consensus of values misunderstands what is best in communitarianism. Robert Bellah expresses my
view exactly:
Those who think of community as a form of Gemeinschaft, as well as their liberal critics, tend to
think consensus about values and goals must be complete or nearly complete. Is such complete
consensus realistic, or even desirable, in modern societies?
The answer, of course, is no. Yet this lack of unanimity need not create problems for
supporters of community. While community-shared values and goals do imply something more
than procedural agreement—they do imply some agreements about substance—they do not
require anything like total or unarguable agreement. A good community is one in which there is
argument, even conflict, about the meaning of the shared values and goals, and certainly about
how they will be actualized in everyday life. Community is not about silent consensus; it is a
form of intelligent, reflective life, in which there is indeed consensus, but where the consensus
can be challenged and changed—often gradually, sometimes radically—over time.
Robert N. Bellah, Community Properly Understood: A Defense of “Democratic Communitarianism,”
6 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, no. 1, Winter 1995–96, at 49, 50.
6
Even Rawls recognized the need for a minimum of such agreement—agreement about toleration,
for example—if society is to function, and part of what makes Rawls so interesting is his clear-eyed
recognition of the need for a form of justice that functions. His goal was to discern the premises of “a
reasonably harmonious and stable pluralist society,” a society that is “over time . . . stable and just,”
and his historical view was that “the success of liberal constitutionalism came as a discovery of a new
social possibility . . . . Before the successful and peaceful practice of toleration in societies with liberal
institutions there was no way of knowing of that possibility.” See RAWLS, supra note 4, at xxv
(emphasis added). He thought that, in a liberal society, free and equal citizens divided by opposing
“comprehensive doctrines” nonetheless “all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime”
and his goal was to discover how that might be so. Id. at xviii. But they “all affirm” something—
something quite considerable, in fact. A Rawlsian could be a reconstructivist.
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of the suffering in the world. The problem of wrongdoing is this: whatever
society we build, however good and just, it is the human condition that
some people some of the time will commit wrongs so serious as to attack,
deny, and threaten the values on which society is based and on which the
welfare of the individuals comprising society depends—wrongs both
unbearable to endure and dangerous to ignore—and thus to live in a world
of serious wrongdoing inevitably compels us to face the question of how to
respond. Criminal justice is an institution of response; broadly conceived,
criminal justice is simply the set of practices and institutions by which
societies respond to serious wrongdoing. In a sense, serious wrongdoing
calls criminal justice into being. It is reconstructivism’s insight that if such
wrongdoing is not answered in a way that the community finds intelligible
and adequate, the values and people targeted by such wrongdoing will be
undermined. Thus the reason criminal justice plays a distinctive and
important role in maintaining normative alignment is because criminal
justice in some form is necessary to society’s self-maintenance in the wake
of serious wrongdoing. The point of criminal law and procedure is not
chiefly to dole out retributive justice, nor to optimize material costs and
benefits, nor to minimize coercive harm, the way a Kantian retributivist,
Benthamite utilitarian, or Millian liberal might propose.7 Reconstructivism
breaks with all three of these theories—the dominant theories of criminal
justice in America today.8 The fundamental purpose of criminal justice is to
protect a society’s moral culture. If a theory can be measured by what it
treasures, it is reconstructivism’s distinctive feature that it treasures a
community’s lived moral culture—what Hegel termed Sittlichkeit
(“embodied ethical life”)9—above individual just deserts, efficient crime
control, or liberal mildness.
7

For the backdrop to this contrast, see Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1491–92,
1524–32.
8
In Germany, by contrast, a strand of criminal theory has risen to prominence—the “affirmative
general prevention” theory—that does focus on the need to affirm and defend norms following a crime.
See Thomas Weigend, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN
WESTERN COUNTRIES 188, 209 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001). Affirmative general
prevention is a member of the reconstructive family, though just one member of the family.
9
See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 404 § 34 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (commentary by Allen W. Wood) (“‘Morality’
refers to the subjective life of the individual agent, in so far as it abstracts itself from its social and
historical situation . . . . ‘Ethics’ or ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit) means something like ‘customary
morality.’ Hegel uses it to refer simultaneously to a system of social institutions and to the moral
attitude of the individual who identifies with and lives them.” (internal citations omitted)); see also
ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: RATIONAL AGENCY AS ETHICAL LIFE 6 (2008)
(“[A]ny given social world is also a nexus of common significances, saliences, taboos, and a general
shared orientation that can also either be sustained or can fail. Indeed one of the most interesting aspects
of such a social condition, shared meaningfulness, or intelligibility, is that it can fail, go dead, lose its
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To sharpen this contrast—and to see some of reconstructivism’s
power relative to its competitors—consider how these four theoretical
perspectives would understand the beating of Rodney King by police
officers in 1991 and the riots that followed the officers’ acquittal. If we
stipulate that the beating was a wrong that deserved punishment, a typical
retributivist would see the acquittal in terms of individual injustice and the
rioters’ violence as separate wrongs also deserving punishment, depending
on the appropriate moral evaluation of each case. A typical utilitarian
would see the beating and the riots in terms of crime control, injuries, and
property damage, and would favor a set of responses designed to minimize
crime and cost. A typical Millian would see the beating and riots as
setbacks to liberty—the first a wrongful abuse of state power toward an
individual, the second a wrongful failure of the state to protect individuals
from one another—and would justify punishment in terms of minimizing
coercive harm overall (perhaps coupled with a general taste for
Enlightenment mildness). The problem with these responses is not so much
that they are wrong or false as that they miss what matters most about the
Rodney King situation. The retributive and liberal viewpoints are so
individualistic that they cannot see the sociological character of the events,
and the utilitarian viewpoint is so materialistic (in the sense of focusing on
material, tangible things, like the body, property, and financial cost) that it
cannot see the degree to which the events were about America’s culture.
A reconstructivist, by contrast, sees the Rodney King beating as
encoding a social message that Americans with ordinary cultural fluency
could not fail to understand: that the right to be free from violence is not
secure in encounters with the police, at least if the suspect is black, which if
true means that black Americans have lesser rights than other Americans.
The wrong of the beating thus transmits a dual message, in part about
claims of abstract principle (the right to physical integrity), and in part
about the dignity of the victim and others like the victim (the social
position of black Americans). One cannot understand the wrong in purely
material or purely individual terms; to understand it is to understand its
social meaning.
Yet that is just the first half of the story, for the key to understanding
the Rodney King case from a reconstructive standpoint is to see that the
riots took place, not after the crime, but only after the acquittal. The
beating was caught on video and the video drew immense national
attention, but no riots took place then. People are prepared to accept that
grip, and a very great deal of what interests Hegel is simply what such shared practical meaningfulness
must be that it could fail . . . . His general name for the achievement and maintenance of such a form of
intelligible life is ‘Sittlichkeit’ . . . .”).
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serious wrongs have taken place in their society, if only because they take
place in every society. It was the verdict, not the crime, that spoke with the
community’s voice, and thus it was the verdict, not the crime, that had the
power to affirm or deny the crime’s message about violence, rights, and
race for purposes of defining America’s moral culture. Reconstructivism
sees crime and punishment as an exchange of meanings, a conversation
about the values that will prevail in a community. The issue for a
reconstructivist is always what a crime and its punishment in a given
cultural context mean. In the Rodney King case, the officers’ actions were
in effect an unanswered question to the country: “We regard ourselves as
privileged to use any level of violence we see fit, at least in encounters with
black men. Don’t you?” The community answered through trial and
punishment, and it was the answer, not the question, that cut the threads
that made the rioters feel joined to the community and its laws. Thus the
central tragedy of the affair from a reconstructive standpoint was not the
material loss associated with the beating and riots, nor the various setbacks
to liberty, nor even the miscarriages of justice, but the damage done to
three sets of norms and a body of socially necessary emotions: norms of
equal citizenship; norms of restraint in the use of state violence; norms of
restraint in the use of private violence; and the sense of solidarity between
black Americans and the rest of America, particularly between black
Americans and the police, the state, and the law.
Now, the Rodney King case is exceptional, to be sure, but what makes
it exceptional is mostly a matter of scale. The tens of thousands of typical
crimes and punishments that are the bread and butter of criminal law work
the same way. Thefts break down norms of property, and punishment
rebuilds them. Burglaries deny the security of the home, and punishment
affirms it. Domestic violence degrades its victims, and punishment denies
their degradation. The measure of success in criminal justice is social
solidarity around a shared moral culture; the measure of failure is alienation
and normative disintegration.
Reconstructivism is the work of many hands over time, but it is also
widely misunderstood—even a lost tradition in criminal theory. The people
comprising the reconstructive tradition have not been systematically aware
of one another and of their common point of view, and thus have never
gotten to the bottom of the view; indeed they have often misunderstood it.10
The founding figures are Hegel and Durkheim—the one a sociological
philosopher, the other a philosophical sociologist, as befits a theory
perched at the intersection of those two fields—but many criminal justice
10

1462
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scholars and practitioners who would substantially agree with what Hegel
and Durkheim wrote do not think of themselves as Hegelian or
Durkheimian. Reconstructivism would be in a stronger position if its
adherents were more self-aware and, to that end, I would like here to
venture a suggestion: that many criminal justice democratizers are latent
reconstructivists. That is not a necessary connection: one could be a
democratizer as a matter of criminal justice policy without being a
reconstructivist as a matter of criminal justice theory. (A libertarian
suspicious of official power might hold that view, for example.) But it is
contingently the case that many of those who favor criminal justice reform
in a democratic direction also look at criminal law in reconstructivist ways,
whether self-consciously or not.
Consider the participants in the present Symposium on democratic
criminal justice. The empirical, social scientific work of Tracey Meares,11
Paul Robinson,12 and Tom Tyler13—research on procedural justice,
intuitions about punishment, and legal compliance—focuses on exactly the
relationship between community values and criminal justice on which
reconstructivism is fixated. Their prediction that where those two diverge,
noncompliance will follow, is a contemporary social scientist’s version of
Durkheim’s claims for social solidarity.14 In addition, Meares’s argument
that police actions send social messages that can either undermine or
support a sense of common, equal citizenship fits exactly into
reconstructivism’s understanding of crime and punishment as
communication oriented to solidarity. Antony Duff’s and John
Braithwaite’s criminal law communitarianism—Duff’s philosophical
arguments that criminalization, trial, and punishment should express
11

See, in this Issue, Tracey Meares, Policing Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to
Increase Democratic Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525 (2017).
12
See, in this Issue, Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the
Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565 (2017).
13
See, in this Issue, Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining
the Goals of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2017).
14
Durkheim’s view was that social solidarity based on shared norms produces compliance, and that
fostering such solidarity is the chief purpose of criminal justice: “Thus, the essential function of
punishment is not to make the guilty expiate his crime through suffering or to intimidate possible
imitators through threats, but to buttress those consciences which violations of a rule can and must
necessarily disturb in their faith—even though they themselves aren't aware of it; to show them that this
faith continues to be justified . . . .” EMILE DURKHEIM, MORAL EDUCATION 167 (Everett K. Wilson ed.,
Everett K. Wilson & Herman Schnurer trans., Free Press 1961) (1925). Or to use the model of
classroom discipline, which Durkheim used at the end of his life as a sort of allegory for criminal
justice: “With the child as with the adult, moral authority is a creature of opinion and draws all its force
from opinion. Consequently, what lends authority to the rule in school is the feeling that the children
have for it . . . and everything that might attenuate this feeling, everything that might induce children to
believe that it is not really inviolable can scarcely fail to strike discipline at its very source.” Id. at 165.
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society’s moral condemnation,15 and Braithwaite’s philosophical arguments
that restorative justice should repair fractured relationships16—are
variations on the Hegelian theme of embodied ethical life. The doctrinal
and institutional investigations of Laura Appleman,17 Stephanos Bibas,18
Richard Bierschbach,19 Josh Bowers,20 and Jocelyn Simonson21 all center on
the idea that contemporary criminal law has, to its detriment, sidelined
community voices and values in favor of instrumentally rational
bureaucratic agencies, and that criminal law can only play its proper part in
the social world if it is governed in more community-oriented ways. These
are ideas for which reconstructivism provides theoretical foundations. They
are also ideas that characterize the work of Bill Stuntz, who was, I submit,
both a reconstructivist and a democratizer, though he died before the labels
came into use.22 He is an intellectual father to many of us in the
democratization movement and surely would have joined our efforts had he
only lived a little longer. Finally, one important feature of Dorothy
Roberts’s,23 Jonathan Simon’s,24 Jocelyn Simonson’s,25 and, again Tracey

15

See, in this Issue, R A Duff, A Criminal Law We Can Call Our Own?, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1491
(2017).
16
See, in this Issue, John Braithwaite, Criminal Justice that Revives Republican Democracy,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1507 (2017).
17
See, in this Issue, Laura I Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413 (2017).
18
See, in this Issue, Stephanos Bibas, Restoring Democratic Moral Judgment Within Bureaucratic
Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1677 (2017).
19
See, in this Issue, Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional
Law of Punishment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2017).
20
See, in this Issue, Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655 (2017).
21
See, in this Issue, Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and
Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2017).
22
Consider, for example, Stuntz’s arguments that the cause of American criminal justice’s severity
is not chiefly voters’ harshness but prosecutors’ incentives; that common law mens rea standards,
because of their moralistic and open-ended character, open up a necessary space for nontechnical
argumentation about culpability and equity in criminal justice trials; that criminal justice should
generally be in the hands of local neighborhoods; that, in particular, prosecutors should be elected from
highly local community units like neighborhoods rather than from large counties; that it is juries’ role to
use the power of nullification to exercise mercy and keep state officials in line; that criminal law’s
expressive qualities are key to its proper functioning; that one of the problems with excessive
criminalization is the diminishment of that expressive function; and that alienation is key to the
crime/race problem. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEFINING CRIMES 104, 181–82, 190–
201 (2011); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 283–87, 305–07 (2011);
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 520–23 (2001).
23
See, in this Issue, Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597 (2017).
24
See, in this Issue, Jonathan Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of
America’s Peculiar Carceral State and Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 1625 (2017).
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Meares’s26 arguments about racial justice is the recognition of criminal
law’s capacity to transmit social messages that risk fracturing communities
along racial lines—a capacity and a risk that reconstructivism highlights.
Now, this Symposium is about democratization, not reconstructivism; the
people gathered for it were chosen for their democratic policy
commitments, not their latent theoretical views. But many democratizers in
criminal justice are in fact latent reconstructivists. The link between
democratic and reconstructive ideas is so strong that when people take hold
of one it tends to pull them toward the other.
II.

RECONSTRUCTIVISM AND DEMOCRACY

Why is that link so strong? What exactly is the connection between
reconstructive and democratic ideas? To see the answer, we need to
consider strands of democratic theory that treasure ethical life as
reconstructivism does—that see democracy in terms of a community’s
capacity to form its culture in conditions of deliberative freedom and to
project the culture thus formed into political life. For purposes of fixing
concepts, it is useful to contrast three types of democratic theory: those that
see democracy exclusively in terms of governmental processes (e.g., voting
in elections, representative institutions, parliamentary supremacy, checks
and balances);27 those that see democracy in terms of advancing liberal
values (e.g., equality, liberty, individual rights);28 and those that see
democracy in terms of collective self-determination, popular sovereignty,
and self-government, and therefore focus on whether the views of the
people who make up the political community are reflected in their law
(e.g., majoritarianism, communitarianism, certain types of republicanism).29
One need not see these three as competitors; they might be complements,

25

See, in this Issue, Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and
Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2017).
26
See, in this Issue, Meares, supra note 11.
27
See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241 (Routledge
2010) (1942) (“[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote.”).
28
See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT ix, 7–8
(1997) (defining republican democracy as a system of government based on “freedom as nondomination,” and, in a move that is unusual only for its candor, openly disavowing any close
association between democracy and majority rule).
29
See, e.g., Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24,
25–26 (2006) (rejecting a conception of democracy in terms of liberal values and insisting that, even if
democracy is not identical to majoritarian voting procedures, democracy must nonetheless consist in
some form of collective self-determination).
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highlighting different facets of democracy (surely a multifaceted thing).30
And the list is not exhaustive. I draw the contrast only because it is helpful
for understanding the sense in which reconstructivism is democratic.
Reconstructivism’s democratic character is not a matter of purely
governmental processes or liberal values (the first and second type of
theory or facet of democracy), but of the way in which reconstructivism
prizes the views and values of the people who make up the political
community—that is, the way in which reconstructivism relates to the ideal
of popular sovereignty and self-government embedded in the ideal, “We
the People.”
The central thought is this: in a democratic society, law and other
exercises of governmental power should reflect and respond to the ethical
life of the people living under that law and government. By “ethical life,” I
mean the values disclosed by a community’s public deliberations or
implicit in its social practices and institutions, provided those deliberations,
practices, and institutions reflect or were formed in reasonably nonoppressive conditions. The proviso is not ad hoc. For a community’s ethical
life to have democratic authority, that ethical life must be consistent with
the premise that the people who comprise society should command its law.
That premise necessarily excludes forms of ethical life based on one
portion of society oppressing, manipulating, denying equal citizenship to,
or otherwise dominating another portion of society. Democratic ethical life
is thus necessarily limited to moral cultures formed in reasonably free and
equal conditions. Whether this condition is enough to exclude from
consideration all communities with unjust cultures is an open question, but
it excludes a great many of them, and I think it authorizes us to focus the
inquiry here on the ethical lives of communities that, if not perfectly just,
are at least reasonably decent. My claim, then, is that a decent community’s
ethical life should command a measure of political authority in democratic
societies because part of what collective self-determination means is that a
30

My own view is that democracy is multifaceted and all three of these types of democratic theory,
which do not contradict one another, are true in part. That is, I think majoritarian electoral processes of
the kind Schumpeter describes, supra note 27, are an indispensable minimum in any large democratic
country, both as a matter of definition (using the term “democracy” in a way that makes sense of
ordinary language) and as a matter of securing one of democracy’s great benefits: protecting the
citizenry’s capacity to protect itself against abusive leadership. I also think democracy implies a set of
substantive liberal values: for example, to give each person one vote, and no more, is to affirm the
equality and dignity of the members of the political community. (A majority vote to remove voting
rights from a minority of the population would be undemocratic even if electorally approved.) And I
also think that majoritarian electoral processes and liberal rights are, although necessary, insufficient for
democratic government, because a society is not fully democratic if the members of the political
community cannot participate in fashioning the law under which they live—law that reflects their
values and views.
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political community can see its norms reflected in its laws. I do not claim
that this is the sum of democracy, but it is a facet of democracy, and what I
would like to do in the paragraphs that follow is explain why this facet of
democracy matters and connect it to democratic theory.
The problem that motivates this discussion is the problem presented
when political power in a society is exercised in ways that are grossly
inconsistent with the way in which that society’s people lead their lives and
consider it right to lead their lives—that is, the democratic problem
presented when law and culture become disconnected. The situation arises
most vividly in the context of colonial rule, where the law is potentially
alienating because it is literally alien to the culture it governs: British law in
colonized India sometimes had this character. The law emanated from a
different culture and even when it was a step forward in terms of liberal
values, it was a step back in terms of self-determination, because there was
no sense in which the Indian people could rationally see the law as their
own. The situation can also arise when a splinter group within a society
gets control of the government, as in contemporary Iran. But we need not
look so far afield: one of the odd problems of contemporary American
criminal law is how often we criminalize in ways inconsistent with normal
social practice. In California, for example, the age of sexual consent is
eighteen and, while there is a reduction in charge where the perpetrator and
victim are close in age, it is nonetheless criminal for two unmarried
teenagers under the age of eighteen to have sex; each party counts as both
victim and perpetrator.31 Yet the average American, and presumably the
average Californian, loses his or her virginity at age seventeen.32 Outside
my office in Chicago, there is an eight-lane divided highway that is one of
the city’s major north–south arteries. Naturally, people drive fifty to
seventy miles per hour on that highway, but the posted speed limit along its
entire length is forty miles per hour, which means that virtually every
driver on the road is committing a moving violation, and anyone driving
over sixty-five miles per hour is guilty of a misdemeanor.33 Federal
criminal law in the United States makes sharing videos or music under
broadly defined circumstances a felony carrying a multi-year prison term,34
but 70% of Americans aged 18–29 and 46% of all Americans have illegally
copied or downloaded videos or music, and only 12% of all Americans

31

CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2014).
Key Statistics From the National Survey of Family Growth, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/key_statistics/s.htm#sexualactivity [https://perma.cc/
K8LW-3W6J].
33
See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-601.5 (2016).
34
See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012).
32
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think such copying or downloading should be punishable with
imprisonment.35 The examples could be multiplied. Why American
government, despite a system of elected representatives, establishes such
laws is an interesting question to ponder: surely the influence of powerful
lobbies is one reason (particularly in the copyright case), and police and
prosecutors’ enforcement discretion is another (enforcement discretion, as
Stuntz has argued, gives officials at multiple levels of government
incentives to broaden criminal law).36 But my goal here is not to unpack the
political structures that bring these laws about. My goal here is to vindicate
the intuition that, although these laws were established by elected
representatives, they are nonetheless undemocratic in the normative sense
that the law is inconsistent with the ethical life of the people living under
it.37
The first step is to notice some of the tributary streams of thought that
make up the third type of democratic theory touched on above—that is, the
understanding of democracy in terms of collective self-determination,
popular sovereignty, and self-government. My Manifesto of Democratic
Criminal Justice earlier in this Symposium focuses exactly on these
streams of thought.38 From Max Weber, the Manifesto builds a conception
of democracy as anti-bureaucratic, that is, resistant to rule by a
professional corps of officials and experts exercising the rule-based and
instrumental modes of reasoning characteristic of bureaucratic governance.
In democracies, the lay citizenry, exercising its characteristically equitable
and value rational modes of reasoning, directs the bureaucracy. From
Jürgen Habermas, the Manifesto builds a conception of democracy as
deliberative, that is, a structure of government in which citizens deliberate
in conditions of freedom on matters of public concern, form (however
imperfectly) a democratic opinion or general will on those matters, and
have the capacity to make government heed that democratic opinion or
general will. From Alexis de Tocqueville, the Manifesto builds a
conception of democracy as participatory, that is, a structure of
government in which citizens sometimes take the reins of government
35

JOE KARAGANIS & LENNART RENKEMA, AM. ASSEMBLY COLUMBIA UNIV., COPY CULTURE IN
US & GERMANY 30–31, 40–41 (2013), http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/Copy-Culture.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6TM-6KR7].
36
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 22, at 528.
37
In Reconstructivism, after touching on this theme, I stated that “[w]orking out the metes and
bounds of reconstructivism’s democratic claims would be a large project,” better saved for a separate
article. Kleinfeld, Reconstrucivism, supra note 1, at 1555. This is that separate article. The political
theory in this Part is one aspect of working out reconstructivism’s democratic metes and bounds; the
three principles in the next Part are another.
38
Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367 (2017).
THE
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themselves, engaging in direct self-government (as with jury service) or
forms of popular majoritarianism that are just one remove from direct selfgovernment. What these three bodies of thought have in common is, first,
an insistence that democracy means something more than merely electing
rulers (even “representative” rulers) and, second, a refusal to substitute a
substantive conception of justice or substantive set of liberal values for the
democratic project of self-rule. Rather, anti-bureaucratic, deliberative, and
participatory theory all take seriously the ideal of a sovereign people
governing itself—of government “by” and “of” the people. All three types
of theory center on the view that, for a society to be fully democratic, the
exercise of political power within that society must be closely linked to
“We the People.”
This is clearly the appropriate context for the idea I’m advancing
here—the idea that, in a democratic society, the exercise of political power
must reflect the citizenry’s ethical life. But the Manifesto’s development of
the concept of democracy was designed to fit everyone in the movement to
democratize criminal justice, not just reconstructivists, and the popular
sovereignty-oriented vein of democratic theory that the Manifesto mines,
while certainly applicable to a theory of democracy in terms of ethical life,
is not directly about ethical life. Reconstructivism’s democratic demands
are more specific than those suggested by anti-bureaucratic, participatory,
and conventional forms of deliberative democratic theory.
Reconstructivism is specifically about the link between culture and
government. Our quarry is a form of democratic theory that highlights the
place of culture in understanding what democracy is and why democracy
matters. Such a theory would be a subcategory of the popular sovereignty
vein of democratic thought, alongside or within anti-bureaucratic,
deliberative, or participatory veins of democratic thought. What I’d like to
suggest here is that the raw materials from which to fashion this sort of
culturally oriented form of democratic theory are already available in the
deliberative tradition, and a handful of democratic theorists with
communitarian leanings have begun to mine those raw materials.
Deliberative theory has a certain standard structure. As I write in the
Manifesto, “[d]eliberative democracy focuses on the importance, in any
political community that aspires to be truly democratic, of free and equal
citizens within the community deliberating on matters of shared political
concern.”39 Deliberative theory thus envisions a sphere of communication
prior to majoritarian decisionmaking—Habermas speaks of it in terms of

39

Id. at 1385.
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the “lifeworld” and “public sphere”40—within which, through deliberation,
citizens form a democratic will. They then impress their will upon the law,
and, because the law is made from their views, thereby rule themselves.
The orienting ideal is one of authorship: “where the community makes the
law out of its own convictions, the community can truly be seen as selfgoverning; the people can rationally see themselves as the law’s author.”41
This sounds very close to the idea of fashioning law on the basis of culture
or ethical life. But not all is as it seems. Mainstream deliberative
democracy, particularly in the Habermasian tradition, has a strongly
rationalizing orientation. Theorists in this vein insist that the exercise of
political power must be based, not on actual deliberation followed by a fair
vote, but on a hypothetical consensus that would presumptively follow
from a fully rational deliberative process.42 The game then becomes one of
specifying the relevant idealizing conditions.43 Developed in this way,
deliberative democratic theory becomes almost the antithesis of a
conception of democracy in terms of culture or ethical life—or, indeed, of
any popular sovereignty-oriented conception of democracy. It becomes a
tool by which to condemn real deliberation and real cultures for not being
rational enough (not living up to the idealizing conditions), and thus,
ironically, to delegitimize real majorities for not being democratic enough.
Democracy becomes the rule of what the theorist imagines to be the best
reasons rather than the rule of the people.
I think this shift in deliberative democratic theory from actual selfgovernment to a hypothetical consensus based on perfect rationality is a
mistake of the first order.44 But it need not detain us. The underlying ideas
40

Id. at 1388–89, 1389 n.73.
Id. at 1385.
42
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 107, 110 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992) (holding
that “[j]ust those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as
participants in rational discourses” and that “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet
with the assent . . . of all citizens”).
43
See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 7 (1996)
(presenting, over the course of three chapters, “the kinds of reasons that should be given, the forum in
which they should be given, and the agents to whom and by whom they should be given” in properly
constituted deliberative conditions).
44
Nicholas Wolterstorff expresses my view exactly:
41

Rationality does not typically yield consensus. Rationality coupled with information typically
leaves us disagreeing with each other. . . . [But] [t]here is, after all, a perfectly familiar, and to
my mind admirable, procedure in liberal democracies for reaching a decision on some political
issue when we find ourselves still disagreeing after we have debated—as we almost always do.
We take a vote. In Rorty, Rawls, Audi, Larmore, and their cohorts, there is an implicit dislike
for a procedure that I regard as belonging to the very essence of a democracy, namely,
voting. . . . It’s my view that it is the genius of liberal democracy to guarantee certain basic
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of deliberative democracy—the idea of a communicatively constituted
lifeworld and public sphere, the idea of deliberation giving rise to
democratic opinion that in turn determines government, and above all the
authorial ideal of law that is a community’s own because it reflects the
community’s own views and values—are not married to the rationalist
program. In fact, they are precisely the equipment we need to understand
why democratic law must reflect a community’s ethical life.
Two moves are key. The first is to see that democratic opinion- and
will-formation do not and cannot proceed from some separate sphere of
political discourse hived off from the rest of culture. The communicatively
constituted lifeworld and public sphere in which democratic opinion- and
will-formation take place essentially are a community’s culture. The
opinions and will that emerge from that culture partake of rationalistic
forms of argument but come from many other sources as well, and are
better—sounder, more protected from rationalism’s excesses, more
sensitive to and honest about human realities, more habitable—because of
the complexity of that mixture. Indeed, the lifeworld and public sphere
properly understood consist not only in discourse but also in value-bearing
social practices and institutions. Much of a society’s evolved wisdom
manifests, not in rationalistic forms of argument, but in these value-bearing
social practices and institutions. Baseball, jazz music, and premarital sex
are all part of the lifeworld and public sphere from which democracy is
made. Furthermore, the lifeworld and public sphere cannot be limited to
expressly political matters because “politics” can potentially be anything
and because the inputs into politics can potentially come from anywhere.
The use of steroids in baseball can become a political issue, and when it
does, the set of cultural experiences, images, and values associated with
competitive sports become part of democratic opinion- and will-formation.
In other words, political issues in democratic societies are not just a matter
of narrowly rationalistic political argumentation but of who we are and
want to be as a society—a matter of our ethical life.45

rights and liberties to its citizens and resident aliens, and to assure access by all normal adults to
fair voting procedures.
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 25, 49–50 (Terence Cuneo ed.,
2012). I also discuss this issue in the Manifesto. Kleinfeld, Manifesto, supra note 38, at 1386 & nn.63–
64.
45
Habermas recognizes and criticizes the view I am defending. Some “contemporary republicans,”
he writes, give “public communication a communitarian reading” and thus look at politics in terms of
explicating “a shared form of life or collective identity” and treat political questions as “ethical
questions where we, as members of a community, ask ourselves who we are and who we would like to
be.” Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 4 (1994). He
objects because he thinks these ethical questions are “subordinate to moral questions . . . in the narrow
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The second key move is to see that the authorial ideal (the ideal of a
political community that can rationally see itself as the author of its own
law) extends simply by the terms of its own logic to the idea that a
community’s ethical life must be reflected in its law. The authorial ideal
captures perfectly what goes wrong when law becomes radically
disconnected from culture, as in colonized India under British rule,
contemporary Iran under theocratic rule, or in the bizarre array of
American laws that make ordinary patterns of American life criminal. Such
law is undemocratic because it is not rationally possible for the people
living under it to see themselves as the author of law that violates the
people’s own way of life.
We thus come to a modified version of deliberative democracy in
which the central idea is that democracy requires giving each person a fair
opportunity to contribute to a culture and then submitting the exercise of
governmental power to the culture thus formed. Robert Post is one of the
handful of theorists developing deliberative ideas along these lines.
Borrowing a distinction of Norberto Bobbio’s between autonomy
(etymologically “self-law”) and heteronomy (“other-law”), Post argues that
democratic forms of government are those “in which the laws are made by
the same people to whom they apply (and for that reason they are
autonomous norms), while in autocratic forms of government the lawmakers are different from those to whom the laws are addressed (and are
therefore heteronomous norms).”46 Post therefore asks after the conditions
in which law is truly made autonomously—“what it means for a people to
engage in the practice of self-determination.”47 Concluding that
majoritarian voting procedures are not sufficient,48 he defends deliberative
democracy’s tradition solution: the authorial ideal. The crucial thing is that
the people, through deliberation, form a general will that is democratic
insofar as individual citizens can, on rational grounds, “recognize in that

sense of the Kantian tradition,” that is, “questions of justice.” Id. at 5. But I wonder if the real root of
our disagreement has less to do with our views about the relative priority (and severability) of moral
questions and ethical ones than with his faith, which seems to me so utterly excessive, in rationalistic
forms of argument.
46
Post, supra note 29, at 25–26 (quoting NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP:
THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF STATE POWER 137 (Peter Kennealy trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1989)
(1978)).
47
Id.
48
I wish Post had written that majoritarian voting procedures are necessary but not sufficient. As
discussed supra note 30, I think democracy is multifaceted and I worry that democratic theorists tend to
drift from the (true) proposition that voting is not everything to the (false and extremely dangerous)
proposition that voting does not matter, or does not matter very much. But Post is ambiguous on the
matter. See Post, supra note 29, at 25.
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general will the potentiality of their own authorship.”49 Citizens must be
able to rationally “experience their government as their own,” to
“recogniz[e] particular decisions as [their] own,” and to “have the
warranted conviction that they are engaged in the process of governing
themselves.”50
But then, rather than veering into either Habermasian rationalism or
Rousseauian mysticism,51 Post turns to culture. For the people to have the
warranted conviction that they are governing themselves, the state’s
process for making decisions must be “responsive to [the people’s] own
values and ideas.”52 Participants in the process must, as he continuously
stresses, not have an “alienated” relationship to the law.53 The process must
be at once individualistic and communitarian: individualistic so that
“independent citizens” can “fashion their social order in a manner that
reflects their values and commitments”54 and communitarian because the
socialization processes necessary to create independent citizens require
“healthy and vigorous forms of community life.”55 Speech about matters of
public and private concern cannot be distinguished in this process “because
democratic self-governance posits that the people control the agenda of
government. They have the power to determine the content of public issues
simply by the direction of their interests.”56 Finally, the goal of the
deliberative process is “collective self-definition,” which must “precede
and inform government decision making.”57 For Post, deliberative
democracy is a chain with two links: from individuals to culture, and from
culture to government. Individuals project their moral authority as
members of the community into their culture, and government bows to the
authority of the culture thus formed.

49

Post, supra note 29, at 27–28.
Id. at 25–27.
51
The allusion is to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous presentation of how individual wills combine
to form a general will, which, though a foundation stone in the deliberative tradition, seems to me so
exaggerated as to be at once metaphysically implausible and, paradoxically, anti-democratic: “If, then,
we eliminate from the social pact everything that is not essential to it, we find it comes down to this:
Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme direction of the
general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an indivisible part of the whole.” JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 61 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968)
(1762) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52
Post, supra note 29, at 27.
53
Id. at 26–27, 29.
54
Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social Form, in
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 163, 173 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro, eds., 1993).
55
Id. at 176–78.
56
Id. at 181.
57
Id. at 180.
50
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Post is a constitutional law scholar and writes that his deliberative,
authorial, and cultural understanding of democracy reflects “the theory of
the American First Amendment, which rests on the idea that if citizens are
free to participate in the formation of public opinion, and if the decisions of
the state are made responsive to public opinion, citizens will be able to
experience their government as their own.”58 This culturally oriented
version of deliberative democracy also flourishes in the theory of copyright
law, for, like the First Amendment, copyright law provides a legal
framework for cultural exchange. Yochai Benkler, for example, argues on
grounds of “democratic participation” that law should protect individuals’
ability “to participate in the creation of the cultural meaning of the world
they occupy.”59 And Jack Balkin—both a constitutional and a copyright
scholar—argues that human beings are by nature cultural creatures, whose
interest in “the development of the ideas and meanings that constitute them
and the communities and subcommunities to which they belong” not only
includes the political interest in “public deliberation about issues of public
concern” but extends to the very roots of human flourishing.60 Thus, Balkin
argues, free speech protects individuals’ right “to participate in the
production of culture” and protects the cultural sphere itself from
domination, ensuring that we do not live solely within a culture others
make for us but instead enjoy “a democratic culture.”61 Perhaps it is
unsurprising that, where pure philosophers have fallen prey to a
rationalistic form of deliberative democracy, American legal scholars with
philosophical leanings have begun to uncover a version of deliberative
democracy consistent with the American constitutional tradition, and
therefore both oriented to “We the People” and attuned to the political
influence of culture in any society grounded in “We the People.”
In sum, then, the link between democracy and reconstructivism is this:
reconstructivism’s central claim is that criminal law has a distinctive role to
58

Post, supra note 29, at 27; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)
(explicitly associating the First Amendment with protecting “public discourse”); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (protecting Jehovah’s Witnesses in distributing religious
material because “[t]he essential characteristic of these [First Amendment] liberties is, that under their
shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed”);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (striking down a law that banned communist flags on
the grounds that “[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people . . . is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system”).
59
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 285 (2006).
60
Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5, 34 (2004).
61
Id. at 4.
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play in the social world such that, in the vast majority of cases, it is right
for legal doctrine, governmental practice, and the officials and institutions
that comprise the criminal system to submit to the moral culture of the
community wherein they are situated. That is, reconstructivism insists on
the moral authority of a community’s ethical life in the context of criminal
law. There is a strain of democratic theory that sees the value of democracy
itself in such terms—a view for which the normative core of democracy
has to do with a community’s ability to rationally see itself as the law’s
author. On this view, democratic government is just the echo in politics of a
self-defining culture. Reconstructivism is the conception of criminal law
appropriate to such a conception of democracy. What makes it democratic
is that it treasures ethical life, subordinates criminal law to ethical life, and
sees criminal law’s task in terms of the service it does for ethical life.
III.

THREE PRINCIPLES

What would a democratic–reconstructive system of criminal law look
like? The concept of democracy as community self-authorship is quite
abstract, as is the concept of criminal justice as normative reconstruction.
In order to connect these sweeping ideas to concrete policy interventions,
we need an intermediate level of theory, a set of mid-level principles that
connect in relatively direct ways to the everyday stuff of legal doctrine,
practice, and institutional design.
Normative criminal theory as a field can be, I submit, divided into
three parts: the theory of criminalization (what conduct should constitute a
crime?); the theory of punishment (what principles should guide the type
and extent of punishment meted out for crimes?); and the theory of
criminal procedure (what principles should guide the administration and
enforcement of criminal law?). The theory of punishment has received such
disproportionate attention that it is sometimes confused with the field as a
whole—as if “punishment theory” and “criminal theory” were the same
thing—but these three branches are in fact distinct. If a theory of criminal
justice aspires to be complete or comprehensive, as reconstructivism does,
it must speak to each of them. And it is at the level of these three branches
that policy-guiding principles can be seen.
I would therefore like to propose three principles, each entailed by
democratic–reconstructivism, one to govern each of the three branches of
the field: the moral culture principle of criminalization, the principle of
prosocial punishment, and the “We the People” principle of criminal
procedure.
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A.

The Moral Culture Principle of Criminalization

The moral culture principle of criminalization holds that the only
conduct that may justly be criminalized is conduct that violates and
expressively attacks the values on which a community’s social organization
is based, unless the merits of criminalizing another type of conduct are so
great as to substantially outweigh the harm criminalizing it does to those
same community values.
The moral culture principle thus has both an affirmative, justificatory
dimension and a negative, prohibitory dimension, neither of which is
wholly mandatory. To start on the affirmative side, note that the moral
culture principle indicates (albeit by suggestion) what forms of
criminalization we might favor: we have good reason to criminalize where
doing so hinders a hindrance to the values undergirding the social order.62
After all, a good theory of criminalization should favor criminalizing
something, and most uncontroversially criminal conduct fits the description
of an attack on the values undergirding the social order: as mentioned
above, thefts attack norms of property, burglaries deny the security of the
home, domestic violence attacks victims’ physical integrity and equality.
But the principle does not require criminalizing every attack on shared
norms because it recognizes that our good reasons to criminalize may be
overridden by other values. The conduct in question may be minor or
private in ways a free society should overlook, or crucially, the challenge to
the established order may be part of the deliberative process by which
society can or should change. In particular, a great deal of speech,
assembly, and religious heterodoxy attacks the normative order of society
in ways necessary for a free society to grow. The First Amendment can
usefully be understood as an anti-criminalization provision—indeed,
historically it has often functioned as an anti-criminalization provision—
freeing up a sphere of normative challenge and norm entrepreneurship
outside the reach of criminal law. Furthermore, in the United States,
tolerating speech that challenges shared moral culture is, paradoxically,
part of shared moral culture. Crafted under the sign of deliberative
democracy, the moral culture principle does not criminalize in this sphere.
In its negative, prohibitory dimension, the moral culture principle
protects conduct from criminalization where that conduct is part of a
community’s way of life. Going to school, getting a job, getting a drink,
playing a sport—these things cannot be criminalized in our culture because

62

I am cribbing Kant’s phrase that we should coerce only as a “hindering of a hindrance to
freedom.” IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:231, at 25 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) (emphasis omitted).
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they are part of what our ethical life consists in. To do otherwise, to
criminalize elements of ethical life itself, would contradict the very purpose
for which criminal law exists. Yet due to the “unless” clause, this
prohibitory part of the principle may be overridden too: it is a strong but
defeasible presumption, not an absolute. As discussed at length in other
work, I think there are situations so extreme that criminalizing in the face
of a recalcitrant culture makes sense even on reconstructive grounds.63
Reconstructive theory is finally grounded in human flourishing and thus
has the wherewithal without internal inconsistency to acknowledge
situations in which preserving moral culture is itself contrary to human
flourishing. As the “unless” clause also highlights, however, even in such
cases one must recognize the costs such criminalization exacts in the
currency of social solidarity.
Taken together, these positive and negative elements of the moral
culture principle would make the conduct labeled “crime” truly—by its
very nature—antisocial. That term can sound almost quaint in
contemporary ears, but that is only because contemporary patterns of
criminalization have drifted so very far from what crime, on a
reconstructivist view, should be. Our criminal legislation at present reflects
no principle but that crime is whatever the legislature says it is—a principle
of pure positivism based on a view of the criminal instrument in terms of
pure expediency. One way of understanding the moral culture principle is
to see it as holding that criminal law should almost never be purely
positivistic. Criminal law should be codified customary law. If it is custom
in the community to drive sixty miles per hour on the highway, then it
cannot justly be made a crime to drive over forty miles per hour. If it is
custom in the community for friends to smoke marijuana together, then
smoking marijuana should at most be the subject of civil or administrative
control, not criminal. If the community has not arrived at a functional
consensus that taking copyright-protected (but nonrival) intellectual
property is the moral equivalent of theft, then copyright felonies should not
exist. The principle is radical insofar as it profoundly departs from current
practice, but it is conservative in the Burkean sense that it defers to the
evolved wisdom embedded in the practices of a functioning society. What
is genuinely radical in contemporary American criminal law (but hard to
see because it is so close) is how instrumental our ways of using the
63

Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1560–61 (terming this stance of restraint, of not
using the criminal instrument against a community’s ethical life except in extreme cases, “criminal law
Thayerianism” based on James Bradley Thayer’s view of judicial review: strike down a statute only if
its unconstitutionality is “so clear that it is not open to rational question” (quoting James B. Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893))).
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criminal law have become—how readily we have set aside the tradition of
restricting criminal law to widely recognized and highly culpable
wrongdoing and come to accept patterns of expanding criminalization for
no better reason than that criminal law is a useful tool for social control that
can be enlisted against anything we wish to curb. Burke is radical in a
Benthamite world. The moral culture principle insists that criminal law is
generally the wrong instrument to put at the front of cultural change, and it
points criminal law away from purely instrumental uses, away from the
project of sheer social control, toward the more cautious project of cultural
maintenance.
The moral culture principle is thus meant to compete with a utilitarian
and positivistic principle of criminalization based on pure expediency. It is
also meant to compete with the most visible alternative to utilitarian
expediency in the discourse on criminalization, that is, John Stuart Mill’s
harm principle: “[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.”64 The harm principle is not democratic at all; it is
liberal in a libertarian sense. Imagine a society in which selling organs
clearly would attack and threaten the social order—by suggesting that the
body is nonsacred, for example, or that the bodies of the poor are for sale to
the rich. The harm principle in that society would refuse to criminalize
provided the transaction were consensual. Imagine another society in which
selling organs were taken to attack and threaten the social order in some
cases and not others—perhaps when the organs in question would cost the
seller his or her life, but not otherwise. The harm principle would still
refuse to criminalize; the differences between societies one and two just
wouldn’t matter, because the views of the people comprising those
societies wouldn’t matter. Imagine a third society in which the extant
values were sufficiently individualistic and market-oriented that it would be
no threat to society’s values to buy and sell organs at will. The harm
principle there would contingently be consistent with the values of the
people within that society, but the fact that people held those views still
wouldn’t matter. As long as “harm” carries its ordinary meaning, the harm
principle is incapable of responding to the convictions of the people whose
criminal law it aspires to direct. This indifference is improper. It is
undemocratic; it hinders experimentation and social discovery (woe be to
the community saddled with the harm principle if, empirically, the
principle turns out to have bad effects); and it disables criminal law’s
64

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press
2003) (1859). Note that Mill's followers have developed this principle in a more rigidly libertarian, less
culturally oriented way than Mill himself does in On Liberty.
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capacity to accomplish an essential social function, namely, reconstructing
a violated normative order. I also think, though this would require a much
more extensive argument, that the harm principle’s policy implications are
often unsound. Celebrated as it is, the harm principle is not the answer to
overcriminalization.
The moral culture principle is thus a third way—a principled
justification for and constraint on criminalization that is not utilitarian, that
is not the harm principle, and that is consistent with the democratic goal of
enabling the community to rationally see itself as the author of its laws.
B.

The Principle of Prosocial Punishment

The principle of prosocial punishment holds that criminal punishment
should aim, both expressively and functionally, to protect, repair, and
reconstruct the normative order violated by a crime while at the same time
minimizing the damage to the normative order caused by punishment itself.
The prosocial punishment principle has a great deal in common with
the relatively familiar expressive conception of punishment. Like the
expressive conception of punishment, the prosocial punishment principle
centrally includes using the expressive qualities of punishment to condemn
a crime, affirm the social norm violated by the crime, and affirm the dignity
of any victim or victims of the crime. But the principle of prosocial
punishment carries a different range of implications than the expressive
conception of punishment, for two reasons.
First, while the expressive conception of punishment merely notes that
punishment has expressive qualities and uses those qualities to send
condemnatory messages, the principle of prosocial punishment wields
punishment’s expressive qualities in the service of a distinctive and welldefined goal: reconstructing ethical life.65 This goal makes the principle of
prosocial punishment sensitive to something merely expressive punishment
is not, namely, the ways in which punishment itself might send messages
that tear the social fabric. Consider the effect on society’s normative order
of torturing offenders as a form of punishment. The ordinary objection is
that torture violates the human rights of the offender. Reconstructivism
65

In Reconstructivism, I argue that expressivism

is so thin that it is not really a comprehensive theory of punishment or criminal law at all. . . .
One could be both an expressivist and a liberal utilitarian . . . . One could also be both an
expressivist and a retributivist . . . . This mixing and matching is not theoretical confusion: it
results from the fact that expressivism without further specification makes no claims about the
ultimate grounds of punishment, whether justice, welfare, or whatever else. Expressivism is a
building block to be used in various theories of punishment as appropriate.
Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1533.
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observes that torturing an offender would also have collateral effects on the
prevailing moral culture. A community that tortures as punishment is one
in which a set of Enlightenment humanist values related to the infliction of
pain will be unable to take hold of the culture or will lose their cultural
grip. Torturing thieves, for example, might succeed in affirming society’s
commitment to property rights, but in so doing it would undermine a series
of collateral values that are also necessary to maintaining social life.
Torturing thieves would also damage the emotional basis of social life,
especially if anyone in the society loves the offender or cares about others
like the offender.
In pointing out the ways in which punishment itself might send
messages that damage the social fabric, the principle of prosocial
punishment gets at something that I think is quite fundamental to
understanding what has gone wrong in American criminal punishment
today. As I have argued at length in past work:
Implicit in American punishment is the idea that serious or repeat offenses
mark the offenders as morally deformed people rather than ordinary people
who have committed crimes. Offenders’ criminality is thus both immutable
and devaluing: it is a feature of the actor, rather than merely the act, and, as
such, it diminishes offenders’ claim to membership in the community and
loosens offenders’ grip on certain basic rights.66

That is a profoundly antisocial message.67 Notice the irony: it is crime that
is supposed to be antisocial. The principle of prosocial punishment is
fundamentally just that: the claim that punishment should be prosocial—
that punishment should truly be crime’s antithesis. That is the logic of the
call-and-response that is crime and punishment on a reconstructive view. It
is all but the opposite of what America presently does.
The principle of prosocial punishment, like the moral culture principle
of criminalization, thus has both an affirmative, justificatory dimension and
a negative, prohibitory dimension. Affirmatively, the principle means that
punishment must be of such a form and such severity as is necessary to
overcome culturally the message of the crime. In its negative, prohibitory
dimension, the principle means that punishment cannot itself become
antisocial, cannot itself express norms contrary to maintaining shared
ethical life. The observation spurring punishment theory since its
philosophical inception is the anomaly of a community dedicated to the
well-being of its members making the infliction of suffering its end. That is
66

Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 941 (2016).
The twofold normative conclusion of Two Cultures is (1) the critique of American punishment
for having become antisocial and (2) the affirmative principle that emerges from that critique: the
principle of prosocial punishment. See id. at 1036.
67
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why punishment seems to require special justification. Reconstructivism
takes a distinctive view of this root problem. To a reconstructivist, because
punishment does indeed make the infliction of suffering its end, it presents
an expressive conundrum. Punishment does not just have the capacity to
undermine collateral social norms; it has a genetic tendency to do so, at
least in any society dedicated to the well-being of its members. Punishment
theory as we know it begins at the very dawn of the Enlightenment because
the idea that societies should be dedicated to the well-being of their
members was the foundation of the Enlightenment political thought.
Punishment is pulled by its nature to expressively disaffirm the norms on
which social life is built, even as it affirms the norms violated by the crime.
The fundamental challenge of punishment is thus to take action against
offenders sufficient to deny the messages of their crimes without thereby
undermining collateral norms. The principle of prosocial punishment
centers on that challenge.
The second reason the principle of prosocial punishment is different
than the expressive conception of punishment is that—with roots in
communitarian consequentialism—the prosocial punishment principle
recognizes punishment’s practical, nonexpressive functions. If
punishment’s purpose is to restitch a torn social fabric, and the risk it courts
is the risk of becoming antisocial itself, expressivism is not the only thing
that matters. For example, imprisonment tends to damage families, insofar
as it takes parents (usually fathers) away from their spouses and children.
Any communitarian theory of criminal law should care about avoiding
broken families, which gives reconstructivists good reason to favor
noncarceral sanctions when possible and imprisonment close to families
with generous visiting conditions otherwise. Reconstructivism endorses
rehabilitative programming within prisons, opportunities and requirements
to perform useful work, and physical safety from emotionally scarring and
criminogenic conditions, because those sorts of features within prisons
have prosocial effects after offenders are released. For the same reason,
reconstructivism opposes collateral consequences that prevent offenders
from returning to the social fold upon release, such as bars to employment.
Reconstructivism also endorses restorative justice proceedings insofar as
those proceedings recognize that crimes commonly damage interpersonal
relationships and aim to repair those relationships. And reconstructivism is
sensitive to the ways in which punishment’s pervasiveness in certain
communities, particularly poor, urban, African-American communities,
damages the capacity of those communities to function in ways that support
human flourishing. Indeed, as a sociological and communitarian theory,
reconstructivism does not evaluate punishment merely in the individual
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instance, but rather understands punishment as a cumulative practice with
cumulative sociological effects. Reconstructivism thus recognizes special
sociological risks in patterns of punishment, even where many or most of
the individual instances of punishment making up the pattern are justified.
Many of these practical proposals push for a milder form of
punishment than the United States now has, and one might wonder if the
principle of prosocial punishment is necessarily mild—perhaps just a way
of expressing philosophically the revulsion toward punishment that seems
to animate, for example, many theorists of restorative justice.68 The answer
is no: the principle of prosocial punishment is not so one-sided. It
condemns the wrong and insists on forms of punishment severe enough to
be read within the culture as genuinely condemnatory. Light sentences for
serious offenders are wrong: they diminish both the norm and, if there is
one, the victim that the offender assailed. James Whitman has written that
we should return to the mild, individualizing, and rehabilitative era of
punishment that prevailed in the middle of the twentieth century, which he
terms the era of “penal modernism.”69 I suspect that the era of penal
modernism was, if not as bad as the present, at least bad in its own way.
The principle of prosocial punishment counsels mildness in the context of
contemporary American punishment only because American punishment
today is both extraordinarily severe and severe in ways that are
counterproductive from the standpoint of restitching the social fabric. We
expressively exclude and degrade offenders, and then we pragmatically
exclude and degrade them, creating conditions that make ex-cons a
permanent underclass. Our fundamental failure is not that we are harsh but
that we are harsh in antisocial ways.
Criminal law judges, lawyers, and teachers, philosophical punishment
theorists, and penal codes themselves commonly list four justifications for
punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.
Some include a fifth: expressive condemnation. There should be a fifth
principle, but it should be a different fifth principle than “expressive
condemnation.” The five should be: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation,
incapacitation, and normative reconstruction, where the last is understood
according to the principle of prosocial punishment. That means punishment
should not only be expressive, and should not only express condemnation,
but should expressively and pragmatically reconstruct society’s normative
order in the wake of a crime.
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Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 1, at 1522.
James Q. Whitman, The Case for Penal Modernism: Beyond Utility and Desert, 1 CRITICAL
ANALYSIS L. 143 (2014).
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Three Principles

The “We the People” Principle of Criminal Procedure

The “We the People” principle of criminal procedure holds that the
administration and enforcement of criminal law should be by and of the
people—that is, solidaristic, public, embedded in local communities,
primarily value rational rather than instrumentally or formally rational,70
primarily under lay rather than official control, open to particularized and
equitable acts of moral judgment, and seen by a democratic polity as
procedurally legitimate. In short, the “We the People” principle holds that
the values and the principles of institutional design undergirding the “We
the People” formula in the U.S. Constitution should be the normative center
of criminal procedure.
To understand what the “We the People” principle would mean in
practice, it helps to see how profoundly the American procedural system
has drifted away from it. The long arc of criminal procedure’s development
has been toward ever-greater degrees of Weberian bureaucratization. As
Weber presented it, bureaucratization’s defining features are the
displacement of the laity by a professional corps of officials and experts;
the use of technical expertise and rule-based administration in place of
individualized moral judgment; and the triumph of instrumental rationality
(that is, trying to attain a given set of ends as efficiently as possible) over
value rationality (that is, trying to live in accord with a system of values).71
It is remarkable how closely these three features track the history of
criminal procedure. The professionalized corps of officials that define the
modern world of criminal procedure—police forces, full-time prosecutors,
and public defenders—emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.72
Trials, which were once relatively brief, informal affairs involving ordinary
language and moral judgment, evolved gradually into the formal, rulebound, lawyer-controlled factual inquiry they are today.73 Even
constitutional doctrine in criminal procedure has come to have a
bureaucratic orientation. Lawyers and judges since the start of the Warren
Court’s procedural revolution have treated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments as tools, under the control of the professional legal
community, by which to produce rules with instrumental ends: policing the
police, controlling racial injustice, safeguarding individuals against abuses
70

This distinction comes from Max Weber. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE
24–26, 85–86 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et
al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922); see also Kleinfeld, Manifesto, supra note 38, at 1379–80.
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Supra note 70.
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LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27–30, 67–68, 149,
245 (1993).
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See id. at 25, 245–50.
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of state power, aiding law enforcement in arresting and prosecuting the
guilty, and keeping the system reasonably efficient.
But these examples pale next to the paradigm case of
bureaucratization, which is also the most important development in
American criminal procedure’s modern history: the displacement of the
jury trial by plea bargaining. Doctrinally, plea bargaining turns chiefly on
two things: the Supreme Court’s view of the right to trial by jury in purely
individual terms (not as reflecting an interest of the community in the case
but as reflecting a defendant’s individual and therefore waivable right to a
jury trial)74 and the Court’s willingness to allow prosecutors immense
discretion in the bargaining process for the sake of managing large
caseloads and securing convictions rapidly and cheaply.75 Both doctrinal
developments satisfy bureaucratic imperatives of processing cases
efficiently and violate the “We the People” principle by excluding the lay
community from the criminal process.
Indeed, the “We the People” principle suggests a distinctive
interpretation of what plea bargaining is and what is wrong with it. From a
democratic–reconstructive perspective, the criminal jury trial in the
Founding Era is best understood as an institution the essence of which was
to subordinate state power and state officials to the authority of a local
laity and to empower that laity to deliberate in equitable, prudential, and
particularistic ways. In turn, plea bargaining is best understood as an
institutional arrangement the essence of which is to excise the laity from the
administration of criminal justice, empowering state officials and other
legal professionals to exercise control on the basis of the rule-oriented and
instrumental reasoning characteristic of bureaucratic governance. The
very idea of bargaining over justice—negotiating charge and sentence in
order to reduce the risks and costs of trial rather than evaluating the
blameworthiness of an act of wrongdoing that breaches community
norms—shifts criminal justice as a system from equitable particularism to
instrumental rationality, from “morality play” to “machine,” as Stephanos
Bibas has memorably put it.76
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See Laura I Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 440 (2009)
(“The idea that jury trial rights meant community rights held sway until at least the mid-nineteenth
century. . . . The jury trial right, particularly the criminal jury trial right, was almost entirely predicated
on validating the community’s right to propound moral judgments on local citizens, and little concerned
with the defendant’s individual rights and liberties.”).
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See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970) (holding that large sentencing
discounts and threats of death do not prove coercion in plea bargaining and noting that “with the
avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved”).
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STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2012).
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And what is wrong with that? The typical complaint about plea
bargaining is that it is coercive, but from a democratic–reconstructive
perspective, the bigger problem is that plea bargaining could not be worse
at accomplishing reconstructive ends if it were designed to thwart them.
Plea bargaining is very good at processing as many offenders as possible
for as little money as possible. It is utterly unsuited to building social
solidarity around a community’s commitment to the norm violated by the
crime—exactly the thing criminal law on a reconstructive perspective
exists to do. In plea bargaining, the community is absent from both the jury
box and the courtroom, the solidaristic effect of the morality play is gone,
the violated norm is just a legal infraction, the norm’s significance to the
community is just one consideration in the bargain, and the expressive
features of the whole affair are secondary to getting the case processed. The
result enables the criminal system to move more offenders from street to
prison than it ever could on a “We the People” approach, but what it
sacrifices in so doing is the opportunity to reconstruct a violated normative
order in the eyes of the community. Per Bibas: “[R]eforms may reduce the
aggregate amount of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation that the
system can mete out. But sometimes it is worth sacrificing quantity for
quality.”77 The fundamental problem with plea bargaining from a
democratic–reconstructive standpoint is that it is a procedure optimized for
the wrong goal. The “We the People” principle would not require getting
rid of it wholesale but would require sharply reducing it.
Plea bargaining is one example, albeit a paradigmatic example, of the
degree to which the “We the People” principle would, by re-centering
criminal procedure in democratic ways, work revolutionary changes in the
present procedural system. What is interesting is that these changes are
revolutionary only from the perspective of the present: the “We the People”
principle is more faithful to the Founders’ Constitution than the last half
century of criminal procedure has been. Of the various competing goals
that presently orient Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment doctrine—
policing the police, controlling racial injustice, unburdening law
enforcement, keeping the system reasonably efficient, and safeguarding
individual rights—the first four are utterly anachronistic and the last is
misunderstood. The criminal justice system that emerged from the AntiFederalists’ battles with the Federalists in the Founding Era was above all
majoritarian and populist; the institutional design had more to do with
enabling majorities to rule themselves than with safeguarding individual
rights. Indeed, criminal law itself was conceptualized in the Founding Era
77

Id. at xxvii.
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in political terms rather than individualistic ones. It is not too much to say
that the “We the People” principle was the principle animating the criminal
procedure amendments in the Founders’ Constitution. To say that is not to
insist on some form of originalism. It is merely to argue that the “We the
People” principle is in a residual sense part of our law, however much it
would alter our present procedural system.
IV.

THE PRESENT CRISIS

If the above three principles are sound, then what is principally wrong
with American criminal justice has to do with the ways in which the
present system has turned away from democratic–reconstructive ordering
in all three of the major departments of criminal justice. We criminalize in
purely positivistic ways that aim for sheer social control, directing the
criminal instrument to norms over which there is no community custom or
consensus. We punish in ways that say to criminals and the people who
love or identify with them: “You (or the person you care about) are
permanently evil or dangerous, a ruined being, forever outside the
community of the law-abiding.” And we administer and enforce the law in
ways that put the criminal system entirely in the hands of bureaucratic
professionals reasoning in formal and instrumental ways rather than
equitable and value-oriented ways.
How did we get here? The dominant narrative of our criminal justice
system is that it is dysfunctional because the American voter is vengeful,
violent, racist, ill-informed, stupid.78 This persistent narrative is one of the
deepest obstacles to democratic–reconstructive reform—a false picture that
grips the mind because it is just true enough to get people to overlook its
flaws and because it fits so effortlessly into a preexisting set of
expectations many people, particularly among the intelligentsia, bring to
American public life. We came to this dysfunctional present, the dominant
narrative insists, through popular referenda, moralism about drugs, and a
race to the bottom in which voters demanded harshness and politicians won
office to the extent they supplied it. The solution then is to get the public
off the field and leave criminal justice in the hands of responsible officials
and experts.
But notice what a poor fit that narrative is with the nature of the
problems just discussed. With respect to criminalization, the very problem
with the law is how much everyday conduct it covers. That is not the
normal result of political pressure from the American public. As Bill Stuntz
has written: “[C]ontemporary criminal codes cover a good deal of marginal
78
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middle-class misbehavior—a very odd state of affairs, politically
speaking.”79 What really drives American overcriminalization, Stuntz
argued, is not “[s]urface politics, the sphere in which public opinion and
partisan argument operate,” which “ebb and flow, just as crime rates ebb
and flow,” and which often “push toward broader liability, but not always,
and not always to the same degree,” but a “deeper politics, a politics of
institutional competition and cooperation,” which “always pushes toward
broader liability rules.”80 The key to American criminal law’s expansion,
Stuntz thought, is not voters but prosecutors, who have an interest in broad
criminalization (among other things because it greases the wheels of plea
bargaining) and who effectively lobby legislatures for it.81 Legislators too
have an interest in accommodating prosecutors because broad criminal law
that is rarely enforced makes crime control cheap.82 The American public
might be implicated indirectly insofar as they create a tough-on-crime
atmosphere that makes legislators receptive to prosecutors’ wishes. But the
story is not a simple one of lay citizens in black hats and officials in white.
The procedural case is even more dramatic. The American public is
likely unaware that plea bargaining has replaced the criminal jury trial and
would probably be dismayed to discover that fact. It was not lay citizens
that did away with the trial, but legal insiders—prosecutors, judges, even
public defenders—acting on their interests, and indeed acting to exclude
lay citizens from participating.83 That is to say, the single most important
development in the modern history of American criminal procedure, and it
seems empirically a major contributor to mass incarceration,84 was not
79
80
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Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 22, at 509.
Id. at 510 (emphasis original).
Id. at 510, 519–20, 534–38.
See id. at 550–52.
As George Fisher has argued in the leading history of plea bargaining:

By [the nineteenth] century’s end, all three of the courtroom’s major actors—prosecutor,
defendant, and judge—had found reasons to favor the plea bargaining regime. For prosecutor
and judge, who together held most of the power that mattered, the spread of plea bargaining did
not merely deliver marvelously efficient relief from a suffocating workload. It also spared the
prosecutor the risk of loss and the judge the risk of reversal, and thereby protected the
professional reputation of each.
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 16 (2003). The twentieth century added another insider
constituency to plea bargaining’s supporters: “plea bargaining played a surprisingly direct role in
assisting the creation of public defenders’ offices,” which “share[d] the prosecutor’s and judge’s
interests in maximizing systemic efficiency—and hence in plea bargaining.” Id. at 17. The triumph of
plea bargaining is thus a story of “powers and interests.” Id. at 16. Indeed, plea bargaining’s triumph is
a story of “the power of the courtier,” who gains influence “by serving well the interests of those in
high places.” Id. at 175.
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See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 72–77, 133 (2017).
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voters’ doing. Now, again, perhaps the American public contributed by
demanding a tough-on-crime approach that encouraged plea bargaining’s
excesses. But the decision to embrace plea bargaining as an institution, and
the many thousands of individual case dispositions through plea
bargaining, trace back to legal insiders.
The dominant narrative is at its strongest with respect to punishment.
The American public in the era of high crime did indeed demand severe
punishment. But even there, the case is not simple. American crime policy
was lenient for most of the country’s history; voters did not demand toughon-crime policies before the mid-century crime wave, and seem to be
moving toward greater leniency now that the crime wave has subsided.85
There is also evidence of harshness on the other side. Some of the pressure
for long sentences, for example, has come from prosecutors indulging a
punitive temperament or seeking leverage for plea bargains.86 Another
source of harshness has been the sentencing guidelines, which are the
apotheosis of bureaucratic ordering. And even in cases that seem to
exemplify the public’s punitive excess—inordinate sentences under three
strikes laws for stealing golf clubs87 or videotapes,88 for example—it is
worth bearing in mind that groups of prosecutors acting on an
organizational basis had to file those charges and defend them on appeal,
and a series of judges had to agree not to strike them down despite the
Eighth Amendment’s invitation to do so. Ordinary people are surprised and
appalled by the cases precisely because the sentences offend ordinary
sensibilities—precisely because that sort of excess is not what voters meant
three strikes laws to do.
My point is not that the American public is wholly innocent and
American officials wholly to blame for the criminal system’s present
harshness and dysfunction. The public did clamor for harshness in the late
twentieth century. Furthermore, racism has undeniably contributed to the
American criminal system’s particular oppressiveness to black people, as
well as to other minorities. My point is that the dominant narrative is much
too simple. It overstates the degree to which voters gave rise to the present
crisis. It dramatically understates the degree to which legal insiders and
other bureaucratic forces contributed to the present crisis. And, above all, it
does not adequately consider the routes by which change is likely to come.
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As I have argued in past work,89 my view is that the American
criminal justice system’s present harshness and dysfunction are the product
of a toxic combination of popular fear and anger in an era of extremely
high crime and a bureaucratic, instrumentalist approach to getting crime
under control for minimal cost. But the popular anger is changeable:
America was the leading example of penal mildness in the Western world
from the 1770s through the early 1970s, and we have seen with the recent
downtick in crime a resurgent movement toward mildness. What the
history chiefly shows is that the American public turned to harshness
during an era of soaring crime, which is unsurprising and not unreasonable,
but that Americans are not relentlessly harsh: rather, they have the capacity
for harshness but also for mildness and they respond to circumstances. The
point is not just historical: moralistic patterns of thought have a propensity
for changing register, shifting—sometimes quite suddenly—from punitive
condemnation to equally moralistic but more forgiving ideas of
compassion, dignity, and love. 90
The other force standing behind American penal harshness and
dysfunction, however, is a professional criminal justice community
oriented above all to controlling crime as efficiently as possible. Lacking
effective tools for rehabilitation, this approach leads to incapacitative forms
of social exclusion just as pernicious as the moralistic anger, but less
subject to change. The professional criminal justice community also has a
disturbing set of interests and incentives—for example, the prosecutorial
interest in broad, severe criminal codes (in order to secure easy plea
bargains), the legislative interest in cheap crime control (which also favors
broad, severe penal codes, as well as under-resourced and therefore brutal
prisons), or the administrative interest in extensive regulatory criminal law
(in order to secure compliance with the administrative state). These patterns
of thought and incentives do not easily change and show no signs of
slackening with the recent downtick in crime.

89
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‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001), http://nyti.ms/1D36YpA
[https://perma.cc/H95D-RQ2B]). Or witness the profound moralism at work in Europe’s penal
mildness, which was sponsored in Germany chiefly by churches, and which the European Court of
Human Rights today enforces aggressively, frequently, and consistently in terms of human dignity and
other morally charged terms. Id. at 951–55, 1000–02, 1033–35.
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In short, the democratic impulse to anger is changeable and has a
pronounced tendency to give way to democratic mercy. The bureaucratic
desire for control really is relentless. It is time to try democracy.
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